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PERSPECTIVE 
US Africa Policy: Rhetoric Versus Reality 
JESSICA PIOMBO 
Africans have learned to be wary of US in-volvement in the continent. Leaders and citizens adopt this caution for good rea-
son: In the absence of clear historical, cultural, 
economic, or political ties with most sub-Saharan 
countries, US engagement with Africa has been 
shaped more by short-term and volatile interests 
than by a long-term outlook or enduring prin-
ciples and commitments. Thus, US foreign policy 
toward the region has ranged from indifference in 
the 1950s to various styles of cold war meddling 
in the 1960s-80s; evolving into "activism without 
follow-through" in the 1990s, as Donald Rothchild 
put it; and renewed attention through the prism of 
the global war on terror in the early 2000s. 
As a result, US policy in Africa espouses lofty 
ideals, such as promoting respect for human 
rights, good governance, and democracy, which 
tend to be violated in practice. Washington has 
a consistent record of backing governments that 
support US strategic, economic, or military inter-
ests, regardless of the governments' domestic or 
regional behavior. Current US policy toward Af-
rica is bedeviled by these same dualities-some 
might say contradictions-that have undermined 
a true unity of purpose and message. Ultimately, 
these dualities may undermine the advancement 
of American interests in the region. 
This is not to say that the United States has 
adopted policies toward Africa that are destruc-
tive or, on balance, negative. Taken as a whole, 
us programs and policy priorities are designed to 
produce positive results for both Africans and the 
United States. According to the State Department, 
the pillars of American foreign policy in Africa are 
(1) to help build strong and stable democracies, 
(2) to support economic growth and development, 
(3) to strengthen public health, (4) to help pre-
vent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflicts, and 
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(5) to address transnational challenges. These are 
worthwhile goals that most US foreign policy pro-
grams address, either bilaterally or through multi-
lateral efforts. 
BUILDING BLOCKS 
Many countries in Africa have benefited from 
continual refinements to democracy and gover-
nance programs. The United States has reduced 
an excessive focus on holding "free and fair" elec-
tions, which characterized democracy promotion 
in the early 1990s. Programs today devote more 
resources to the building blocks of good gover-
nance: strengthening the rule of law, improving 
transparent and participatory governance, in-
creasing the capability of civilian bureaucracies, 
and building the capacity of civic groups to oper-
ate in the political realm. The US government has 
sponsored such programs in over half of Africa's 
countries, while concentrating on a few, such as 
Liberia, South Sudan, and the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo. 
America's economic assistance provides for ba-
sic needs through the Feed the Future initiative 
and educational programs designed for women 
and children, while also attempting to stimulate 
growth through investment. The United States has 
supported the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative, which aims to prevent corruption and 
abuse of mineral resources by industry actors and 
African governments, and US officials have en-
couraged multinational companies to adopt cor-
porate social responsibility programs. 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act and 
the Millennium Challenge Account, administered 
by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), 
unfortunately have mixed records, but they have 
operated without the political manipulation that 
can taint other aid programs. Both initiatives were 
intended to provide incentives for African states 
to diversify their economies, reducing reliance on 
commodity exports, and to clean up governance in 
order to qualify for developmental aid. There are 
various reasons why they have not had their in-
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tended impacts, related to the relatively small vol-
ume of us-Africa trade, the relatively small size of 
MCC grants, and competition from Chinese busi-
ness investment. 
Regarding health policy, while the President's 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief still dominates us 
programs, it has evolved from an initial emergency 
response, focused on distributing anti-retroviral 
drugs, into a more sustained and comprehensive 
effort to strengthen basic health care systems. US 
efforts today deal more with malaria, tuberculo-
sis, and basic nutrition, responding to concerns 
among public health professionals that an exces-
sive concentration on HIV/AIDS missed the true 
health care crisis in Africa. 
To help prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed 
conflicts, America engages both diplomatically 
and with security instruments. US officials and 
envoys have helped facilitate peace talks and 
peace-building efforts in Burundi, Sudan, South 
Sudan, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Con-· 
go, and other conflict-prone countries. Washing-
ton has also worked to enhance the capacity of 
the African Union (AU) by training peacekeep-
ers and providing logistical and communications 
support to the AU's ongoing peacekeeping ini-
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t1at1ves. Theater security cooperation programs 
have helped a number of African countries in-
crease border security, professionalize their mili-
taries, improve civil-military relations, and facili-
tate coordination in response to disasters. 
To address transnational challenges, Washing-
ton has introduced maritime security programs to 
help combat oil bunkering, narcotics trafficking, 
piracy, and fisheries depletion. The United States 
has been particularly active in the Mano River Ba-
sin in West Africa and in the Gulf of Aden. In ad-
dition, Americans have provided counterterrorism 
training in the Sahel and East Africa, and law en-
forcement training through the International Law 
Enforcement Academy in Gaborone, Botswana's 
capital. In 2007--08 Washington consolidated its 
military and security programs in Africa under the 
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). 
In response to all this engagement, sub-Saharan 
Africans consistently return some of the most pos-
itive evaluations of the United States, its leaders, 
and its role in the world. A 2008 Gallup poll found 
that 62 percent of sub-Saharan Africans approved 
of the performance of US government leadership, 
more than double the support in any other region 
of the world. This positive trend has continued in 
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subsequent Gallup polls and yearly surveys by the 
British Broadcasting Corporation. 
However, the evidence suggests a divide be-
tween average African citizens and opinion lead-
ers (political elites, journalists, intellectuals) in 
how they view the United States, as well as impor-
tant differences among countries. For instance, 
South Africans tend to evaluate the United States 
more harshly than citizens of other countries in 
the region. And, while opinion polls demonstrate 
positive popular views of the United States, opin-
ion leaders tend to be much more negative-led 
by the most vocal critic, the government of South 
Africa. 
DoUBLE STANDARDS 
The us government endangers this overall 
goodwill when it promotes strategic imperatives 
that contradict the full set of its foreign policy 
goals. Where cold war imperatives once created 
contradictions between rhetoric and reality, now 
counterterrorism imperatives do the same. The 
evolution of the "Global War 
ton would support intervention in a country with 
lucrative oil assets, but not in one without them. 
To be fair, the AU opposed outside intervention 
in Ivory Coast (though it also took the same stance 
toward Libya), while the United States helped craft 
a multilateral response from behind the scenes. 
Nevertheless, the comparisons were rife in media, 
the blogosphere, and social media. In today's in-
formation age, failing to win the public relations 
game in the virtual world can make image reality. 
The continuing focus on counterterrorism can 
undermine stated priorities in democracy, gover-
nance, and conflict mitigation. Aside from the ex-
amples of Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, consider 
Somalia. In 2007, the United States supported Ethi-
opian military action against the Islamic Courts 
Union (ICU). The ICU, only partially aligned with 
Al Qaeda, had been the first organization to estab-
lish any form of peace in Somalia since the early 
1990s. But as an Islamic government that chal-
lenged the internationally sanctioned (though do-
mestically illegitimate and powerless) Transitional 
Federal Government, the ICU 
was seen as a terrorist threat. on Terror" into the "Struggle 
Against Violent Extremism" in 
2011 has not led to substan-
tively different security poli-
cies. Counterterrorism-now 
officially known as "Counter 
Violent Extremism" -consid-
erations still dominate us se-
US foreign policy officials 
could be more honest about 
Critics argued that the 
United States, in helping the 
Ethiopians to eradicate the 
ICU, had initiated a proxy war 
to overthrow an organic, effec-
tive government. The rise of 
what the United States does 
and does not do, and why. 
curity assistance in Africa. 
Thus, countries that support US military-
strategic efforts, like Nigeria and Ethiopia, do not 
find their massive assistance programs suspend-
ed when their governments rig elections, oppress 
opposition, and violate human rights, while 
smaller countries experience these sanctions. 
Rwanda, hailed as an economic success story and 
regional military power, also avoids sanctions de-
spite the government's sharp restrictions on free-
dom of speech and the press and its repression of 
opposition movements and activists. 
This trend of sacrificing democratic and gover-
nance ideals in the name of strategic imperatives, 
the continuation of a decades-old tendency dating 
to the cold war, confirms many Africans' (especially 
the elites') expectations of us governmental behav-
ior. When the United States seemed to stay silent 
on a crisis in Ivory Coast in 2011 at the same time 
that it advocated intervention in Libya, despite the 
fact that massacres were occurring in the former 
but not the latter, it implied to many that Washing-
Al Shabab, an Islamist militant 
group, has been directly tied to the demise of the 
ICU in Somalia, and it poses a much larger threat to 
stability throughout the Hom of Africa. 
A recently initiated effort to help train East 
and Central African militaries to track down and 
eliminate the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) could 
potentially defuse some of the bad press that the 
United States has earned from its security engage-
ments in Africa. But in order for this to work, the 
effort has to be successful. In 2009, US military 
forces partnered with the Ugandan military in an 
operation to eliminate the LRA. This effort failed, 
and in reprisal the rogue militia massacred hun-
dreds of civilians in multiple countries. Not only 
was this embarrassing to the United States and 
tragic because of the innocent lives lost, it also 
resulted in a popular backlash against Washing-
ton and AFRICOM for launching an offensive op-
eration within Africa. The current effort, with a 
contingent of 100 US military advisers deployed 
in late 2011, is a "train and equip" program, rath-
er than direct intervention. This could help insu-
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late the US government from another backlash if 
the effort fails. 
ON SHAKY GROUND 
Even so, as Washington increases its military 
involvement in Africa, it threatens to confirm 
suspicions aroused by the creation of AFRICOM 
in 2007, suspicions that ranged from relatively 
mild fears of the "securitization" of Africa policy 
to conspiracy theories suggesting that the United 
States was preparing to invade and initiate "re-
gime change" in countries that obstructed US ef-
forts. AFRICOM spent much of its first two years 
attempting to dispel such rumors, arguing that the 
military command merely reflected an attempt to 
"rationalize" US defense engagements in Africa. At 
the very least, the public diplomacy and strategic 
messaging required to convince the African public 
that these fears are unfounded increase with each 
military operation. 
The United States must take care not to un-
dercut the good done by the much larger range 
of American economic, governance, education, 
health care, and humanitarian programs. The un-
dermining effect from the emphasis on security 
priorities is important for several reasons besides 
the public relations quandary that it creates for the 
US government. 
First, the United States historically has sur-
rounded its foreign policy goals with an aura of 
moral superiority based on its support for demo-
cratic values, human rights, and economic free-
doms. US officials take the moral high ground in 
most foreign policy discussions. Public instances 
in which the United States violates or ignores 
these ideals, therefore, undermine the ground on 
which it stands in the foreign policy arena. 
Second, if the goals of foreign policy are to 
protect, preserve, and advance a country's power 
and influence through alliance building, strategic 
maneuvering, and strengthening its national secu-
rity, actions that alienate potential allies and lose 
international support inhibit the ability to pursue 
those goals. America's high-profile security activi-
ties weigh more heavily in Africans' views of the 
merits of Washington's regional involvement than 
do its activities in the realms of governance, devel-
opment, health care, education, and humanitarian 
assistance. The irony is that these last sets of pro-
grams are where the US government in fact spends 
most of its foreign assistance budget. 
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If the international public perceives US foreign 
policy as defined by militarization and aggressive 
posturing, and if African regimes continue to be-
come increasingly responsive to their citizenries, 
the governments may have to actually respond to 
public opinion when it conflicts with security ar-
rangements. In some instances, this has already 
happened: When the Kenyan parliament followed 
American encouragement and proposed tough 
antiterrorism legislation in the mid-2000s, public 
outcry forced it to withdraw the bills. Other Afri-
can governments similarly may be forced to reduce 
cooperation with US security initiatives. Should 
South Africa or a comparable critic of the United 
States gain a permanent seat on the United Na-
tions Security Council, this will further increase 
the challenge to US security policies. 
By continually talking out of both sides of its 
mouth, Washington undermines its own programs, 
policies, and goals. In an ideal world, the United 
States would live up to its stated commitments to 
democracy, human rights, promotion of good gov-
ernance, and humanitarianism. However, in the 
real world it would be naive to suggest that the 
us government sacrifice national security consid-
erations for other values, regardless of the compel-
ling argument that more respect and commitment 
to these ideals would reduce the security problems 
that the United States finds so threatening. Very 
few countries would be willing to alienate a criti-
cal ally over human rights abuses, and the United 
States is no exception. Most African leaders know 
this, and would appreciate it if Washington would 
own up to it. 
RESPECT 
A maximal recommendation following from 
this analysis would be for the US government to 
follow through on stated commitments to gov-
ernance and economic ideals. However, in the 
absence of such a triumph of idealism, US for-
eign policy officials could be more honest about 
what the United States does and does not do, and 
why. In this minimal solution, US officials would 
publicly admit that the country pursues its own 
interests first and foremost, but work to align 
US interests with African ones, recognize where 
and when interests are incompatible, and oper-
ate from a position of mutual respect. The result 
could not possibly be more damaging than the 
current approach. • 
